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Abstract 
This study analyzed the influence of the affective forecasting bias on depressed and non-
depressed groups. While the literatures on both affective forecasting and depression are robust, 
there are no studies to date which assess how the affective forecasting bias and the cognitive 
biases of depression might interact. The present study was able to replicate previous findings in 
the affective forecasting literature, where Forecasters predicted they would feel much worse after 
being rejected for a hypothetical date than did Experiencers who were actually rejected. The 
analyses of this bias in depressed groups failed, in part, due to insufficient group sizes. A 
preliminary potential moderator of the forecasting bias is reported and clinical applications are 
discussed. 
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The Affective Forecasting Bias in Depressed and Non-Depressed Groups 
Affective forecasting refers to an individual’s prediction of how he or she will feel in the 
future, given a specific outcome (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). George Loewenstein (2003) suggests 
that “[e]ven when people can accurately predict the outcomes of their decisions, they may not be 
able to accurately predict the feelings associated with those outcomes” (p. 180). Thus, simply 
knowing the result of your actions does not necessarily mean you know how you will react to 
that result. People are generally good at forecasting valence and specific emotions (Loewenstein, 
2003). When asked to consider a future event, the average person can accurately forecast 
whether or not they will feel positively or negatively. They can also predict with a fair amount of 
precision what emotions they will feel: sad vs. happy, angry vs. confused, etc. For example, if a 
person were asked to forecast how they would feel if they were offered a new and lucrative job, 
they would be able to predict that they would feel positively (as opposed to negatively) and 
rather happy and excited (as opposed to terrified or humiliated).  
Nonetheless, individuals make inaccurate predictions with regard to the intensity and 
duration of their emotional reactions given specific outcomes. They have difficulty predicting the 
severity of their emotions, and how long those emotions will last. Both intensity and duration of 
their feelings tend to be overestimated by forecasters, as compared to what is actually 
experienced (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). For example: if a person were to asked to forecast how 
they would feel if their favorite sports team won the championship game next week, they might 
predict that they would feel great and that these feelings would last for several days, or even 
weeks. However, what is more likely is that that individual will feel rather good that day, but 
those feelings would not continue to be as intensely positive for as long as anticipated.  
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This tendency to overpredict the intensity and duration of one’s emotional response is 
called impact bias, and one potential cause of it is focalism (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). Focalism 
occurs when people fail to take into account how other environmental factors will affect them, 
when asked to forecast their feelings given a specific future event. In this study, freshman 
college students were asked to predict their emotions following assignment to either a desirable 
or undesirable dormitory. The colleague students were not quite as happy in the desirable 
dormitory as had been predicted, nor were those students relegated to the undesirable dormitory 
as sad as predicted. 
There are a variety of reasons supplied for why this forecasting bias occurs. In Wilson & 
Gilbert’s (2005) dormitory study, the authors posit that the college students failed to take into 
account how other events and situations would alter their mood. There were other life events that 
surround and mollify the importance of the single, predicted event. The students may have 
thought that living in an unattractive dormitory would be terrible, but much of a college student’s 
day is spent in class or perhaps at work. Living in an unpleasant place does not preclude enjoying 
life outside of that place. Alternatively, having a great place to live does not protect a person 
from fights with their partner or failing grades. Placing too much importance on one life factor 
may lead to bias, because there are so many other stimuli in our environment. 
Wilson et al. (2004) also suggest that people fail to take into account how quickly they 
will be able to mentally work through the future event, so as to maintain their emotional well-
being. This is termed immune-neglect. When forecasting negative events in particular, 
individuals appear to underestimate their level of skill in coping psychologically (Gilbert et al., 
1998). Gilbert et al (1998) showed this bias in a variety of contexts, including broad scenarios 
like the termination of a relationship, and specific contexts like the tenure process of college 
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professors. In each of these situations, Forecasters over-predicted their emotional responses 
compared with the people that actually experienced them.  
Finally, society and personal experience both have a strong impact on the feelings and 
emotions we attach to specific situations, as well as how we would personally react to them. In 
many cases a culture may share similar feelings toward a particular event (“Marriages are happy 
and celebratory occasions”), but that does not mean that they are always accurate (“Married 
Happily Ever-After”). In fact, entertainment media are abound with examples of protagonists 
dramatically pining over a relationship turned sour, their responses much more extreme than one 
might expect. Further, people do not always accurately judge how their own past experiences 
have made them feel. Gilbert and colleagues (1998) suggest that this combination of shared 
cultural expectations and personal experiences are bound to result in a number of inaccuracies in 
the way humans predict the future outcomes of specific events.  
To summarize, the affective forecasting bias (among other things) causes individuals to 
predict more extreme impact of their emotions, given some future event, than they would if they 
actually experienced it.  
Depression 
Information-processing refers to the process whereby individuals sift through stimuli in 
their environment, and assign meaning to those stimuli. This process can help shape beliefs, as 
well as affect decisions and expectations. Biases in this area would serve to unduly influence the 
level of importance the individual places upon certain pieces of information, and subsequently 
the thought and decisions that the individual makes. Aaron T. Beck’s (1967) cognitive model for 
depression suggests that people with depression are distinguished by their persistently negative 
views of the self, world, and future (the cognitive triad). In this way, a person experiencing a 
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depressive episode is likely to feel negative about their own self-worth, their immediate 
surroundings, and many of their upcoming endeavors. In addition to these negative (perhaps 
biased) cognitive processes, individuals experiencing a depressive episode exhibit negative 
affect, a loss of interest or pleasure in activities they previously enjoyed, as well as physiological 
abnormalities in their sleeping and eating patterns. Abramson, Metalsky, and Alloy (1989) have 
added to this theory by suggesting that depressed individuals may place a disproportionate 
amount of significance to what is perceived as a negative event, resulting in sustained 
hopelessness. Hopelessness, in turn, can produce the depressed affect, apathy, and physiological 
outcomes Beck’s model describes (1967). In sum, depressive symptomatology can affect all 
aspects of the human condition, and have implications for perceptions of the past, present, and 
future. 
There has been a long-standing interest in specifying the role of information-processing 
biases in the etiology and course of mood disorders (Clark et al., 1999). One particularly robust 
finding is a substantial memory bias that is exhibited by individuals suffering from depression 
(Williams et al., 2002). Depressed individual’s past undertakings are often cognitively skewed in 
such a way as to make events seem more negative than they actually were. This biased view of 
the past ultimately affects the depressed individual’s schemas and subsequently their perception 
of their current and future states (Beck et al., 1979). The literature also supports the notion that 
when depressed individuals perceive failure in future endeavors, they suffer from the same level 
of negative affect as they would if they actually failed (Beck et al., 1979).  
Affective Forecasting and Depression 
 Although biases in affective forecasting and the cognitive biases associated with 
depressed individuals are robust constructs in the literature, there is no study to date which 
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analyzes the way depressed individuals would respond to the affective forecasting bias. In fact, 
when Wilson and colleagues (2004) conducted a study of the affective forecasting bias they 
deliberately excluded participants who scored higher than a 10 (mild depressive symptoms) on 
the Beck Depression Inventory. The question arises: do depressed individuals show the same 
kind of bias in their predictions of the future, and if not, how might they forecast differently? 
Since the general population seems to have some information-processing biases in the form of 
affective forecasting, it is plausible that a depressed group, which is already characterized by 
significant cognitive biases, may have a differential affective forecasting bias.  
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1  
The first goal of this project is to successfully replicate the previous findings in the literature of 
affective forecasting in a non-depressed sample, specifically with regard to the affective 
forecasting bias. Thus, the first hypothesis is stated: 
H1. In the non-depressed sample, Forecasters will predict that they would feel worse after being 
rejected by the date than Experiencers who actually are rejected. 
Hypothesis 2 
Second, I would like to determine the extent to which people with depression differ from non-
depressed people in terms of the affective forecasting bias. It may be that the cognitive biases 
inherent to depression may cause affected people to differentially exhibit the affective 
forecasting bias, relative to non-clinical people. Thus: 
H2a. In the depressed sample, Forecasters will predict that they would feel worse after being 
rejected by the date than Experiencers who are actually rejected.  
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H2b. Additionally, the depressed Forecasters and Experiencers will have a more pronounced bias 
than that of the non-depressed Forecasters and Experiencers (i.e. depressed Forecasters will be 
even more biased than non-depressed Forecasters). 
Hypothesis 3 
Finally, I plan to manipulate non-depressed groups in such a way as to mimic the biases I 
anticipate being evident in the depressed groups. Significant findings may help illuminate the 
field as to possible mechanisms by which the biases evidence in depressed populations might be 
perpetuated. Thus: 
H3. In the non-depressed sample, Experiencers who are expecting to get rejected by the date and 
are put under cognitive load will report mood rating more similar to the depressed Experiencers, 
than other non-depressed Experiencers. 
Method 
Sample and Design 
Participants (n= 181; 64% women) were recruited from pool of Psychology 100 Research 
Experience Program students and were distinguished as either “depressed” or “non-depressed” 
based on prescreening measures (BDI-I, described below). Students who reported BDI scores 
higher than 18 and less than 2 were invited via email to participate in our study. Only invited, 
prescreened participants were allowed to complete our study. Of this group, 167 were classified 
as non-depressed, in-session (≤ 19 on BDI-II; 92%), and 14 indicated moderate to severe 
symptoms of depression (> 20 BDI-II; 8%). This follows the recommended cut-off scores 
reported in the BDI-II manual, such that scores of 20-28 indicate moderate depression and 29-63 
indicate severe depression (Beck, Brown & Steer, 1996). 
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Demographically, the average age of participants in this study was 19.1 years (SD = 
3.66), and the sample largely identified themselves as white or Caucasian (85%, n = 154). Of the 
remaining participants, 11 students identified themselves as African American (6%), 11 more 
identified themselves as Asian (6%), and the remaining participants indicated ‘other’ (3%). 
The study design is essentially a 2 (Forecaster/Experiencer) x 2 (Depressed/Non-
depressed), with a fifth group of non-depressed Experiencers with an additional manipulation 
(described in detail below).  
Measures 
Depression. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-I) (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961) is a measure of depression symptoms with satisfactory test-retest reliability 
(Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988; Steer, Beck & Garrison, 1986). It is a 21-question self-report scale 
with items ranging in value from 0 to 3, thus possible scores are 0 (minimal depression) to 63 
(high depression). This measure was used during prescreening to identify individuals as either 
depressed or non-depressed. 
 The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is the most current revision of the Beck 
Depression Inventory. This instrument is a widely used and well validated measure. It is a 21-
item self-report instrument used to assess the existence and severity of symptoms of depression. 
Coping. The Brief COPE (Carver, 1997) is an attenuated version of the COPE inventory (Carver, 
Scheier & Weintraub, 1989) with 28 items and 14 subscales. It is used to assess which coping 
strategies participants have used in a recent troubling situation with items such as “I've been 
saying to myself ‘this isn't real’”. Each of the items are measured on a four-point scale with the 
anchors labeled “I haven’t been doing this at all” and “I’ve been doing this a lot.” 
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Procedure  
Drawing on the paradigm used by Wilson et al. (2004), the design used in this study was 
that of a dating game. Each participant was met by a trained member of the study personnel 
individually, and was given a packet of information detailing the basic procedure of the 
experimental session. After the participant had given their consent, they were told that they 
would take part in a game that was intended to assess heterosexual dating processes. From this 
point on, the participant believed that they had been randomly assigned to a three-person group 
of study participants from different universities, who interacted via internet. The group 
ostensibly consisted of the actual participant, a person of their same gender, and a third person of 
the opposite gender. In truth, there was only one participant and the other two “members” were 
created for the purpose of the study. Our participant was ostensibly competing against the 
participant of the same gender (the Competitor), to gain a hypothetical date with the third 
participant (the Judge). This third “participant” would read personal information and see a 
picture from each of the other two participants.  
 To bolster the deception, a picture was taken of our participant with a digital camera and 
then the study personnel connected the camera to the computer via USB cable to upload the 
picture to the Judge. For reasons of confidentiality, the study personnel deleted the pictures from 
the digital camera before the end of the session and no pictures were actually uploaded to another 
computer. Then, the participant was given a computer and started the dating game. 
 To assess baseline mood, the participant was given two items on a 1-9 scale (“How 
positive or negative is your mood right now?” 1: Extremely Negative, 9: Extremely Positive; 
“How happy do you feel right now?” 1: Not at all Happy, 9: Extremely Happy). These items 
have been used in prior research (Wilson et al., 2004) to establish mood. Then, the participant 
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was logged in to the network, and saw a loading screen for approximately 12 seconds. The basic 
game was again described to the participant, and they saw a picture of the Judge to help 
strengthen the cover story. Next, the participant was prompted to supply some personal 
information to help the Judge decide between themselves and the Competitor. There were six 
boxes with headings like “Major/Minor,” “Annoying Habits,” and “Proudest Moment” that the 
participant had to click on and enter information. When they had entered information into each 
box, another loading screen came up, and the participant was instructed to wait while “a separate 
experimenter checked these responses and then relayed them” to the Judge. 
After the participant was assured that their responses had been relayed, they had the 
opportunity to view some personal information supplied by the Judge, by clicking on six boxes 
with headings like “Major/Minor,” “Annoying Habits,” and “Proudest Moment”. The 
information therein was held constant across all participants, and were appropriate responses for 
either gender of respondent (e.g. “I like to hang out with my friends and maybe go to one of the 
parks in town. Sometimes I go bowling with my friends which is good for a laugh...”). This was 
again done to bolster the cover story, but also so that the participant would feel a stronger 
connection with the Judge. This was done under the assumption that the more real that person 
seemed to them, the more engaged they would be in the experiment. 
The end of the game varied, depending on whether the participant was in the Forecaster 
or Experiencer condition. Forecasters were ultimately asked to predict how they would feel, if 
they were rejected by the Judge. This was assessed using an adjusted version of the baseline 
mood measure (e.g. “How positive or negative would your mood be if you were rejected for the 
date?” 1: Extremely Negative, 9: Extremely Positive). In the Experiencer condition, participants 
saw another waiting screen while the Judge “made their final decision” between the two 
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participants. Then, the participant was told they had been rejected by the Judge. The original 
mood measure was used to assess their mood directly after this information was given to them.  
A final manipulation was given to some non-depressed participants. Participants in this 
condition were Experiencers who, before being told they had lost the date, were informed that 
the Judge had reviewed half of the available information and had determined that the participant 
had a 98.5% chance of losing the date. This number has been borrowed from previous research 
to convey that the likelihood of losing the date is all but certain (Wilson et al., 2004). This 
manipulation is intended to cause the participants to initially feel negatively about the date, 
although the literature suggests that inherent cognitive strategies will take over to reduce 
cognitive dissonance and minimize the overall effect on the non-depressed participants 
(Festinger, 1957; Simon, Greenberg & Brehm, 1995). To reduce their ability to employ such 
strategies, participants in this condition were also given a cognitive load task, intended to impair 
their executive functioning. This was done with a well-established method (Gilbert & Hixon, 
1991; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Tobin & Weary, 2003) where participants are given twenty 
seconds to memorize an 8-digit number, and then must continually rehearse this number until the 
end of the condition. Research in this field suggests that such a task should hinder higher-level 
thinking, which is required to effectively perform the strategies a non-depressed individual 
normally would to reduce the amount of cognitive dissonance they are theorized to experience. 
Under this cognitive load, participants were then told they had been rejected, had their mood 
assessed, and then entered their 8-digit number. For a summary of each of the five conditions, 
see Table 1. 
After all participants indicated their post-game mood, the experimenter read them a 
partial debriefing statement which indicated the deception inherent to the game. Great lengths 
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were taken to assure that the participant knew their personal information had not been evaluated 
in any way, and that every single participant received the same feedback. The participant was 
allowed to ask any clarifying questions, and then the second half of the study began. This 
included the electronic assessment of all other study questionnaires (except the BDI-I). 
Results 
 To analyze pre- and post game mood, the two items (described in the methods section 
above) used to assess mood were averaged together to produce total pre-game and post-game 
mood scores, pre-game: r(179) = .83, p < .0001; post-game: r(179) = .75, p < .0001. The primary 
dependent variable for each analysis was change in mood. I applied each of two common ways 
to calculate change in a variable between two time points1. First, I used the residualized change 
score model. These scores are calculated by using a regression model in which the prior measure 
serves as a predictor of a subsequent measure of the same construct. Residuals from this 
regression are outputted and serve as the measure of residualized change. Second, I used gain 
scores. Gain scores are calculated by subtracting post-game mood from pre-game mood (pre-
game mood – post-game mood = gain score). Because participants in this study were expected to 
generally respond by indicating a post-game mood that was lower than their pre-game mood (in 
other words, their interaction with the game made them sadder), a higher gain score indicated a 
participant that experienced an increase in negative affect. 
Hypothesis 1. As a replication of Wilson et al.’s (2004) work, the first hypothesis was that non-
depressed (BDI-II ≤ 19) Forecasters would predict a more negative post-game mood than the 
post-game mood reported by non-depressed Experiencers. To examine this, I first used the 
residualized change model. In this model, there was a significant effect of condition (Forecasters 
vs. Experiencers2) on mood F (2, 113) = 13.44, p = .0004, d = .48 (a small effect; Cohen, 1988). 
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After adjusting for participants’ pre-game moods, Forecasters (n = 62) predicted an average post-
mood of 4.67 (SD = 1.78), whereas Experiencers (n = 54) reported a significantly less negative 
average post-game mood of 5.56 (SD = 1.90).  
 Using the gain scores to examine the same question, there was also a significant 
difference between mood forecasted by non-depressed Forecasters and the mood experienced by 
non-depressed Experiencers F(1, 114) = 9.89, p = .0021; d = .59, a medium effect. Whereas 
Forecasters predicted a mean mood of 2.08 (SD = 1.40), Experiencers reported experiencing a 
mean mood of 1.26 (SD = 1.40), indicating a modest increase in the negativity of their moods.  
H1 states that non-depressed Forecasters will predict that they would be significantly 
sadder if they lost the date than Experiencers who are actually rejected. The above analyses are 
both significant and in the predicted direction of H1, therefore H1 was supported.  
Though not a primary hypothesis, I also examined whether there was an interaction of 
gender and condition on mood, using the residualized change model. There was no interaction 
between condition and gender in predicting change in mood from pre to post dating game, F(4, 
125) = 0.18, p = .68, so gender was not used in subsequent analyses.  
Hypothesis 2. For H2, I had only planned to analyze depression from a binary, categorical view 
(depressed = BDI-II ≥ 20; non-depressed = BDI-II ≤ 19). Given sample size concerns, however, I 
also analyzed depression as a continuous variable. H2a predicts that depressed Forecasters will 
predict sadder mood scores than will depressed Experiencers. Using the residualized change 
model, a non-significant effect of condition on mood was outputted, F(2, 11) = 1.35, p = .26, 
with an effect size of Cohen’s d = .44; a medium effect. The depressed Forecasters (n = 7) 
reported an average post-game mood of 3.40 (SD = 1.93). This is less than that of the depressed 
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Experiencers (n = 7) who averaged 4.25 (SD = 1.93), a direction that is consistent with the 
affective forecasting bias, but not at a significant level:  
 When examining this hypothesis with a gain score model, I failed to find a significant 
effect of condition F(1, 12) = .31, p = .59, d = .30. Again, depressed Forecasters reported 
numerically more negative mood scores (M = 1.21, SD = 1.32) than did their depressed 
Experiencer counterparts (M = .64, SD = 2.39), but this difference was not significant.  
H2b. This portion of the hypothesis predicts a significant interaction between condition and level 
of depression, resulting in a more pronounced forecaster bias in the depressed group than the 
non-depressed group. Using the residualized change model, there no evidence of an interaction 
between depression and condition, F(4, 125) = .03, p = .86. A similar non-significant result was 
obtained with the parallel gain score model, F(3, 126) = .09, p = .76.  
 Given the small number of participants in the depressed group, I also examined this 
hypothesis using BDI-II scores as a continuous variable. Using both the gain score approach and 
the residualized change approach, neither of the interactions of interest (i.e., BDI-II by condition) 
were significant (ps > .4).  
 As both the residualized change and gain score models converge on the non-significance 
of forecaster bias in the depressed group and the non-significant moderating effect of depression 
on mood, H2a and H2b were not supported. 
 For a summary of these first two hypotheses, refer to Figures 1 and 2. 
Hypothesis 3. Of the 51 participants in the non-depressed cognitive load Experiencer group, 47 
were able to correctly report the 8-digit number given to them. The remaining 4 made small 
errors (incorrectly reporting one or two of the digits; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), therefore all 
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participants were rehearsing the number appropriately and can be said to have been cognitively 
busy.  
H3 originally was designed as a comparison between depressed Experiencers and non-
depressed Experiencers who were under cognitive load. This was predicated on the assumption 
that the depressed sample size would be larger, and that there would be a significant interaction 
between depression and condition. Since neither of these assumptions were met, I have analyzed 
H3 as a comparison between Experiencers under cognitive load and other non-depressed 
Experiencers.  
Using the residualized change model, these Experiencers under cognitive load did not 
report significantly different mood than did the non-depressed Experiencers from H1, F(2, 102) 
= 0.19, p = .66; d = .07, which does not meet the lowest cut-off of d = .20, a small effect. The 
means in Table 2 indicate that the cognitive load Experiencers were very slightly happier than 
were the other non-depressed Experiencers. The gain score model yields similar results, F(2, 
102) = 0.19, p = .66; d = .08. This pattern of results suggests that these two groups of non-
depressed Experiencers were responding to the date rejection in a similar way. Due to the 
adequate size and comparability of these two groups, and since they responded so similarly, H3 
must be rejected.  
Exploratory Analyses 
 In addition to the hypotheses reported and analyzed above, some exploratory analyses 
were performed using the 14 subscales from the Brief COPE as moderators of the effect of 
condition. One interesting finding was from the subscale Denial, which assesses the degree to 
which a person denies the reality of a situation as a coping mechanism for negative events. 
Denial had a significant moderating effect on condition, F(4, 125) = 5.04, p = .03. To understand 
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this interaction, I calculated the correlation between denial and mood separately among 
Forecasters and Experiencers.  Whereas the correlation between denial and mood was not 
significant for Forecasters, r(67) = .08, p = .51, Experiencers correlation was significant, r(67) = 
-.30, p = .01. This suggests that while Forecasters were relatively unaffected by their use (or 
disuse) of the denial coping strategy, Experiencers who used it tended to be sadder following 
their rejection. In other words, the Experiencers appear to be driving the effect of this interaction 
of denial and condition. The implications of this finding are discussed below. 
Discussion 
 This study is largely supportive of prior research in the area of affective forecasting, and 
finds further support for the affective forecasting bias. Our non-depressed Forecasters predicted 
they would have felt much worse if they had been rejected for the date than did the non-
depressed Experiencers who were actually rejected. This replication of findings is of relatively 
small importance to this robust literature, but it suggests that the present design had adequate 
manipulations.  
 The dating game paradigm was appealing in that it taps a social interaction in which our 
college sample would be interested. Students entered the study believing they were actually 
interacting with another student, and in a generally familiar context: the dating world. This is a 
staple of the college experience, and one that was intended to elicit more natural responses in an 
otherwise tightly controlled laboratory setting. Although the dating game paradigm has been 
successful in at least one previous study (Wilson et. al, 2004), the electronic stimuli used in this 
study were slightly different from previous studies. While some of the information given to 
participants was shared between this previous study and the present one, such as the labels for 
the personal information boxes, there were differences as well. Different programs were used to 
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construct the study stimuli, which led to entirely different screen-layout and other visual stimuli. 
Additionally, in a deceptive design, there is always the matter of the participant actually being 
deceived by the study. The statistically successful replication of the affective forecasting bias 
supports the notion that the study design was adequately appropriate and engaging. 
 While it seems likely that the basic procedure and manipulation were able to detect 
signal, the lack of statistical power unfortunately precludes definitive conclusions of the 
differences in depressed and non-depressed groups. It would be unwise to make any definitive 
statements, in general, about the role of depression in the affective forecasting bias based on 
these results. 
 With regard to Hypothesis 3, there were certainly enough participants to adequately 
compare with the other non-depressed groups. Unfortunately, while the non-depressed 
Experiencers and Experiencers under Cognitive Load encountered substantially different 
manipulations, they reported nearly identical moods. Since the cognitive load and negative 
expectations manipulation has never before been attempted in the affective forecasting literature, 
it has no prior basis for being a viable manipulation.  
 Next, there is very preliminary evidence for the coping strategy of denial being a 
potential moderator for the affective forecasting bias. These analyses were not a part of any prior 
hypothesis, and as such must be treated as exploratory. However, it appears that Experiencers 
who used the coping mechanism of denial had a much worse mood than Experiencers who did 
not. So, people who respond to trials in their life by putting themselves mentally in another place 
and pretending it isn’t happening are the worse for it. Interestingly, use or disuse of this coping 
mechanism did not seem to affect the Forecasters positively or negatively. This suggests that 
coping mechanisms may not actually come into play when an individual is making predictions 
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about their feelings. This is consistent with the theory posited by Gilbert and colleagues (1998) 
which suggests that the psychological immune system may not be prophylactic when one 
imagines future negative events and the subsequent negative emotional reactions. Of course, the 
question becomes: if non-use of coping mechanisms in the prediction of negative future events 
causes the forecasting bias, what happens when the event predicted is positive and no coping 
mechanism is necessary? This will be addressed in the final section. 
Potential Clinical Implications 
 Few ties between the affective forecasting literature and the clinical psychology have 
been made.  However, there are potentially important implications of the affective forecasting 
literature for clinical psychology and the findings of the present study (though not definitive) are 
worth considering in this context. No differences of affective forecasting bias based on level of 
depressive symptoms were identified. Although I failed to find evidence of an affective 
forecasting bias in the depressed sample, it may be that larger studies would have found such a 
relationship.  Indeed, the effect size for the difference between Forecasters and Experiencers was 
fairly comparable across depressed and non-depressed groups.  
 Even if depressed people do not show a greater bias in affective forecasting, it may be 
that this bias would be of special importance among depressed people – if, for example, it serves 
to maintain avoidance. Avoidance has been identified as an important maintaining factor in 
depression (Jacobson, Martell & Dimidjian, 2001). It would not be surprising if the tendency to 
expect intense, long-lasting negative emotional reactions was related to avoidance behaviors. 
Therefore, future studies might examine not only the magnitude of the affective forecasting bias 
among depressed people, but also interventions designed to reduce this bias facilitate approach 
(as opposed to avoidance) behaviors.  
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 Though my finding regarding denial is clearly exploratory and should be regarded as 
preliminary, it is interesting to consider the ultimately implications of this finding if replicated. 
People who are depressed and tend to use avoidance or denial related coping strategies may have 
at least two important factors maintaining their emotional difficulties. First, like their non-
depressed peers, they may exhibit an affective forecasting bias. Though not addressed by the data 
I collected, it seems likely that this bias could serve to maintain avoidance. Second, to the extent 
that people engage in denial as a coping strategy, they may actually exacerbate their negative 
experiences when bad outcomes do occur. This would actually serve to make them look less 
biased in their affective forecasting. If these possibilities are borne out by future research, it 
raises the possibility that interventions might target both affective forecasting biases (in the 
service of counteracting avoidance behaviors) and interventions might target avoidance-related 
coping strategies such as denial (as they may exacerbate or prolong negative emotional 
experiences).  
Future Studies and Limitations 
Future studies need to address the following issues. First, a larger depressed sample is 
necessary to tease out the actual differences (if any) between depressed and non-depressed 
groups with regard to affective forecasting. With a sample size of 14 depressed people, sample 
size is a major limitation of the present study.  
Second, this study was largely conducted using a combination of the experimental 
software MediaLab and webpage designing software. This allowed for every keystroke of the 
participant to be operationalized and accounted for by the experimenter, but also had the 
limitation of not actually interacting with the other “participants” in the dating game. This 
increases the internal validity of this study, allowing the experimenter to exactly replicate all 
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stimuli in the study for each participant, but in so doing also reduces the ecological validity of 
the study. Some may criticize this research method as being an unrealistic task, as the social 
interaction occurring during the manipulation does not actually include another physical human-
being.  
However, with the recent rise of social interaction via internet, this game may have 
increasing ecological validity. With the advent of social networking and dating websites, 
humanity is evolving the term “relationship” to keep up with the ever advancing technology. 
This, in combination with the successful replication of the forecasting bias found in previous 
studies with more ecological validity (Wilson & Gilbert 2005) suggests this is a minor limitation.  
Finally, the coping mechanism, denial, may moderate the affective forecasting bias. 
Further investigation of this coping strategy, in this context, needs to be explored. Predictions 
based on the exploratory results from this study would state that these coping mechanisms may 
play a role in the way individuals actually experience the event, but not how they predict they 
will experience it. The role of the psychological immune system in a forecasting context may be 
important in discovering how individuals can become better predictors of their own feelings.  
 
Affective Forecasting            22
Footnotes 
1 Whereas some researchers recommend the use of residualized change scores rather broadly 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1988); others recommend the use of gain scores for most analyses (Singer & 
Willett, 2003). In a review of this literature, Paul Allison (1990) has suggested that the gain score 
method may be viable so long as there is no causal effect of scores at time 1 on scores at time 2. 
Ultimately, as this is not always known with certainty, Allison suggests that perhaps the best 
method of analyses in this situation is to use both models and only accept the results when the 
two agree. Thus, both residualized change scores and gain scores will be reported in the 
following analyses. 
2 Note that this group does not include data from the group of non-depressed Experiencers who 
were put under cognitive load.  
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Experiencers with high probability of losing 










Summary of Mean and Standard Deviations by Condition and Group
M SD M SD M SD
3.40 1.93 1.321.21 4.67 1.78 2.08 1.40
4.25 1.93 2.39.64 5.56 1.90 1.26 1.40



































Mood Residualized Change Scores*







































Pre-/Post Game Mood Gain Scores*
Note. *Larger gain score indicates more negative affect. 
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